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China’s evolving political and economic 
dynamics and international ambitions 
provide fertile ground for analysts in many 
sectors. China’s economic growth rate has 
moderated to a “new normal” of 6.5 per-
cent, putting pressure on Beijing as the 
country prepares to reshuffle its leaders at 
this fall’s upcoming 19th Party Congress. 
Meanwhile, a range of new policy initiatives, 
from the Cybersecurity Law to the Made in 
China 2025 Plan, find China vigilantly mon-
itoring “hostile foreign elements.” Despite 
these anxieties at home, China projects 
growing confidence and leadership 
abroad. Over the past year, President Xi Jin-
ping emerged as an unexpected champion 
of globalization at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos against the backdrop of 
a new American administration bearing a 
more inward-looking populist mandate. 
China has also accelerated its ambitious 
Belt and Road Initiative, made progress 
toward concluding a binding code of con-
duct with ASEAN, and affirmed the leading 
role it can play in implementing the Paris 
Climate Agreement. 
Amid China’s dynamic transformations, we 
are excited to present the third edition of 
the China Studies Review as a platform to 
highlight the contributions of students at 
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies toward better under-
standings of China, its relationships, and its 
evolving role on the world stage.
The first section of this issue features two brief 
issue papers. Ned Collins-Chase examines 
the Qianhai Free Trade Zone and considers 
its prospects as a tool for Chinese capital 
account liberalization. Minh Joo Yi surveys 
China’s foreign policy calculus under Presi-
dent Xi Jinping and notes Beijing’s growing 
assertiveness in foreign affairs.
In the second section of this issue, we pres-
ent three research articles spanning China’s 
environment, nuclear weapons strategy, 
and economy. Miaosu Li analyzes a little 
understood aspect of China’s wind energy 
development  - the associated environmen-
tal costs of rare-earth metal processing 
- and calls for a more nuanced assessment 
of Chinese energy policy and implemen-
tation. Amanda Van Gilder provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the nuclear bal-
ance between the United States and China. 
She concludes that while the United States 
will maintain nuclear superiority for the next 
one to two decades, the gap will close as 
China gradually attains doctrinal and tech-
nological parity. Benjamin Pollok compares 
the homeward investment patterns of the 
diaspora populations of China and India. 
Pollok attributes China’s greater success in 
attracting this investment to its active dias-
pora engagement policies  — a strategy not 
yet meaningfully pursued by India. 
We in the China Studies Program are 
excited to highlight the high quality of 
student scholarship at the Johns Hopkins 
School of Advanced International Studies 
in this publication. To provide a sense of the 
rich intellectual environment that fosters 
this work, we close this issue with a selected 
list of speakers and topics presented in the 
past year at our programs in Washington, 
D.C. and China. 
We would like to extend our gratitude to the 
student authors and editors for their commit-
ment and hard work in advancing this young 
publication, to the faculty and mentors who 
supported this work, and to our faculty advi-
sors, Carla Freeman and Madelyn Ross, for their 
expertise, advice, and unyielding support for 
the China Studies Review.
Kaj N. Malden, Editor-in-Chief 
Shanghai, China 
Adam B. Lee, Executive Editor 
Washington, D.C.
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China’s Challenges 
in Advancing Capital 
Account Liberalization: 
The Case of the Qianhai 
 Free Trade Zone 
Ned Collins-Chase
Introduction 
As China attempts to engage in meaningful 
capital account liberalization, it faces a bal-
ancing act:  implementing reforms to boost 
productivity, spurring development of its ser-
vice industry, and enhancing renminbi (RMB) 
convertibility, while at the same time avoiding 
the risks of capital flight and threats to the via-
bility of state-owned enterprises employing 
millions of workers. Pilot Free Trade Zones 
(FTZs) have become one of the tools China 
will use to implement capital account reforms, 
with the Qianhai FTZ focusing on broad-
ening financial flows between Hong Kong 
and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. 
While the Qianhai FTZ offers new avenues 
for China to continue its experimentation 
with economic reforms and advance capital 
account liberalization, these avenues cannot 
be fully explored without appropriate par-
allel sequencing of macroeconomic policy 
reforms at the national level. 
The role of FTZs in China’s  
economic reform and the  
prospects for the Qianhai FTZ
The Shanghai FTZ, the first among the recent 
wave of FTZ announcements, was created 
as a testing ground for looser financial 
regulations and capital account liberaliza-
tion.1 The Chinese government disclosed 
plans for the zone to the public just two 
days before its official opening in late 
September 2013. The announcement was 
followed by a three-month silence by the 
government, and no official information 
about the zone was provided to potential 
investors. The three-month lag may have 
given officials time to win the support of 
skeptics within the government, as well as 
the opportunity to create further interest 
among investors by strategically releasing a 
series of information leaks regarding the FTZ.2 
Salient policies implemented in the Shang-
hai pilot zone included fewer restrictions 
on foreign currency exchange; a “negative 
list” outlining industries in which foreign 
investment is still restricted, in order to facil-
itate the ease of investment in industries 
without these restrictions; and simplified 
company registration processes.3 Some of 
the experiments from the Shanghai pilot 
zone have since been approved for nation-
wide implementation, including the use of 
a negative list and streamlined company 
registration procedures.4 There are also 
early indications that the effects of China’s 
efforts to liberalize capital controls can be 
seen in the Shanghai FTZ, with data show-
ing that Chinese capital controls have had 
less impact since the FTZ’s launch.5 How-
ever, while there is a possible correlation 
between looser capital controls and imple-
mentation of the Shanghai FTZ, recent 
policy reversals have threatened progress, 
and the degree to which novel policies will 
be allowed remains uncertain.6
The Qianhai FTZ, part of the Guangdong 
FTZ group, is expected to officially open 
in 2020. It is different from the other FTZs 
in that it specifically seeks to leverage the 
offshore RMB market in Hong Kong. Hong 
Kong is already a major staging point for 
foreign firms seeking entry to China, and 
serves as a source for investment that can 
spur the development of more modernized 
industrial and services sectors. The Qianhai 
district will comprise 15 square kilometers 
of the total planned 28.2 square kilometers 
of the larger Guangdong Pilot FTZ in Shen-
zhen.7 The stated purpose of the zone is 
to serve as a platform for modern service 
industry cooperation between Hong Kong 
and the mainland as a part of the Mainland 
and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partner-
ship Arrangement (CEPA) and the broader 
“Belt and Road Initiative” introduced by Xi 
Jinping. The government seeks to capitalize 
on Qianhai’s proximity to both Hong Kong’s 
financial sector and Shenzhen’s manufac-
turing sector to attract corporations seeking 
to develop a modernized service industry 
in the region. 
To incentivize participation in this project, 
corporations and investors seeking to do 
business in Qianhai receive preferential 
treatment, including a steep reduction in 
the corporate income tax rate. There is 
some disagreement among sources as to 
exactly how much of a reduction this will 
be; some sources say the corporate tax 
rate will be 15 percent, while the official 
project website lists the reduction as a 15 
percent decrease.8 Both tax rates are lower 
than the 25 percent national rate and the 
16.5 percent rate in Hong Kong. Qualified 
individuals within the zone will also receive 
tax subsidies. Qualified manufacturers can 
apply for financial support, and foreign-in-
vested corporations will be able to avoid 
bureaucratic delays by utilizing one-stop 
administrative procedures established within 
Qianhai. The greater zone will, like Shang-
hai, also feature bonded ports outside of 
Chinese customs and value-added tax (VAT) 
exemptions. Moreover, to create a more level 
financial playing field for foreign corporations 
and investors, Qianhai will feature new judi-
cial and arbitration reforms, which are touted 
as part of “a law-governed socialist demon-
stration zone with Chinese characteristics.”9
A major factor determining the success of 
FTZs as a tool for capital account liberal-
ization is China’s commitment to actually 
implement policies allowing for looser cap-
ital controls. Because of the risks inherent 
in the liberalization process and recent 
economic difficulties, this commitment is 
far from given. As mentioned, recent devel-
opments in the Shanghai pilot zone give 
cause for concern that similar difficulties 
may impede the success of Qianhai. Further 
concerns arise from the poor performance 
of one of the FTZs’ signature tools in pro-
moting capital flows: RMB-denominated 
bonds issued outside of China, popularly 
referred to as “dim sum bonds.” After a dif-
ficult year for dim sum bonds and offshore 
RMB markets in 2016, prospects continue 
to look bleak for their performance in 
2017.10 It will be difficult for Qianhai to 
be successful in broadening capital flows 
between the Hong Kong RMB market and 
Shenzhen if demand for dim sum bonds 
remains weak. 
Beijing is truly walking a tightrope in 
its attempts at capital liberalization. 
On the one hand, China would like to 
see its currency attain greater weight 
in the global financial system, not only 
for the prestige it would bring, but also 
because of the belief that an increased 
proportion of trade financed by RMB 
would help China better withstand 
large-scale crises, such as the 2008 
global financial crisis which threat-
ened its export volume.11 On the 
other hand, China’s economy is still 
largely following a model of maintain-
ing exports and financing investment 
through domestic savings, and abrupt 
liberalization of currency valuation and 
capital flows could make China vul-
nerable to maintaining a trade deficit 
and the risk of large-scale capital flight.12 
Fears of the latter seem confirmed in Chi-
na’s recent tightening of capital controls in 
response to the effects of a cheaper RMB, 
and the action’s deleterious effects on dim 
sum bonds in 2016.13 However, if China 
wants to succeed in its long-term aims of 
rebalancing its economy, it must liberalize. 
The necessity of this shift, coupled with the 
prospect of humiliating failure should the 
FTZ experiment prove to be a flop, gives 
Beijing a strong incentive to redouble its 
future efforts and to ensure Qianhai’s success. 
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Conclusions and policy 
considerations
Physical spaces in which to implement 
capital account liberalization are neither 
intrinsically useful nor harmful in the effort 
to reform capital control systems, but they 
may have benefits in the Chinese context. 
The use of pilot FTZs is indicative of Chi-
na’s preference for gradualism in adopting 
economic liberalization, like the dual-track 
reforms created during the 1980s through 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and may 
reflect an effort to marshal support for these 
reforms by building on an existing, and 
popular, format. If China succeeds in this 
regard, the choice of using physical spaces 
to house FTZs is appropriate.
The formation of the Qianhai FTZ is a 
legitimate approach to capital account 
liberalization in theory, but in practice the 
zone will only be as successful as the over-
arching capital account liberalization that 
should accompany it. There are concerns 
regarding the function of the Shanghai Pilot 
Zone that represent real risks to the success 
or failure of the FTZ experiment. While the 
Shanghai Zone has already contributed to 
national economic policy reforms through 
the broader approval of a negative list, 
ambiguity remains regarding its possi-
ble contributions toward looser currency 
restriction and simplified corporate reg-
istration. Further, it remains questionable 
whether it can guarantee the implemen-
tation of meaningful reforms or create 
confidence among investors.
If China seeks to pursue internationalization 
of its currency, it must maintain a measure 
of caution, but also become more willing 
to accept levels of capital outflow. Without 
willingness to accept this risk, the tools at 
the disposal of FTZs will be considerably 
curtailed. Regardless of the type of currency 
convertibility and capital account liberal-
ization China is willing to pursue, it must 
commit fully to these policies to maintain 
investor confidence, and to avoid retreating 
to tighter capital controls. Qianhai will be 
more likely to succeed if it demonstrates 
a credible guarantee by the government 
to pursue currency and financial liberaliza-
tion, while assuaging fears of the growing 
pains of liberalization among local actors 
and domestic businesses. 
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Since Xi Jinping’s assumption of the 
presidency of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) in late 2012, Chinese foreign 
policy-making processes have become 
noticeably more centralized. Increasingly 
confident of its national capabilities and 
elevated international stature, China now 
seems to have adopted a more assertive 
foreign policy stance in order to pursue its 
core national interests around the world 
and to reshape the Western-led global 
governance structure. This policy memo-
randum proceeds to outline evolutions in 
China’s foreign policy-making processes 
and objectives, as well as their implications 
for China’s relations with the U.S. and the 
world at large. This analysis closes with a 
consideration of the durability of China’s 
foreign policy positioning under Xi Jinping. 
Chinese foreign policy-making  
process from Mao to Xi
Shortly after the founding of the PRC in 
1949, Mao Zedong and his cult of person-
ality concentrated political power in one 
individual, resulting in top-down foreign 
policy decision-making. As a result, foreign 
policy formulation and implementation pro-
cedures throughout the Mao era were less a 
result of institutionalized and systematized 
processes than a direct reflection of Mao’s 
own personality and idiosyncrasies. 
Compared to his successor Deng Xiaop-
ing, who studied in both France and the 
Soviet Union, Mao had little exposure to 
foreign culture and institutions. This back-
ground may explain China’s relatively 
self-reliant foreign policy during the Mao 
era. Additionally, Mao readily mobilized a 
“century of humiliation” national narrative, 
emphasizing China’s losses and conces-
sions to foreign “imperialist aggressors.” 
This deep-seated animosity toward foreign 
powers was reflected in China’s severance 
of relations with the United States, and even 
in the deterioration of its relations with the 
Soviet Union, its fellow socialist comrade. 
Chinese foreign policy positioning changed 
significantly after Deng Xiaoping became 
China’s paramount leader in the late 1970s. 
One of the most prominent changes was 
the gradual emergence of rule by con-
sensus, whereby Deng collaborated with 
colleagues in the Politburo Standing Com-
mittee to formulate and implement policy. 
This was a noted departure from Mao’s 
leadership style, wherein policy decisions 
were perilously dependent on the actions 
and judgments of one individual. These 
new consensus-driven practices involved 
a “collective system of checks and balances 
that spanned a variety of bureaucratic insti-
tutions and included a substantial number 
of party elites,” which “shunned Maoist cults 
of personality and embraced the studied 
staidness of leaders like Hu Jintao.”1 
Under the subsequent administrations 
led by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Chi-
na’s foreign policy-making process grew 
increasingly diffuse.2 China’s process of 
merging into the international political 
and economic order required the con-
struction of new domestic agencies, as 
well as interagency groups (“Leading 
Small Groups”) responsible for reconciling 
divergent interests among them.3 As these 
new political actors became a part of the 
foreign policy-making nexus, coordination 
problems arose, most clearly illustrated by 
the extended negotiations over China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization 
from 1986 to 2001. 
Xi Jinping’s leadership style strives to con-
solidate decision-making power against 
this backdrop of a fragmented Chinese 
bureaucracy, and recent political trends in 
China suggest that Xi is likely to exert more 
influence over the country’s foreign policy 
than either of his two predecessors. These 
trends include Xi’s holding of top positions 
in “Central Leading Groups,” supra-minis-
terial organs established by the party that 
“supersede all other government agencies 
in the power structure.”4 Since 2013, Xi has 
assumed leadership of the Central Leading 
Group for Comprehensively Deepening 
Reforms and the Central Leading Group 
for Internet Security and Informatization, 
and perhaps more importantly, the National 
Security Commission and the Central Mil-
itary Commission. These positions ensure 
his ability to control internal security, for-
eign, and military policies to a degree 
that Hu Jintao did not enjoy.5 The Chinese 
media and party officials’ recent references 
to Xi as the “core (hexin 核心) leader” may 
also be an indication of his indisputable 
dominance in leadership.6 
China’s central foreign 
policy objectives
Since Xi Jinping’s accession to power, 
China seems to have altered its principal 
foreign policy objective to take a more 
assertive stance in order to pursue its core 
national interests around the world. Schol-
ars generally agree that the principles of 
“creating a good external environment to 
maintain development” and “keeping a 
low profile (tao guang yang hui 韬光养晦)” 
have guided Chinese foreign policy since 
the reform era, at least until the Hu Jintao 
administration.7 However, Xi Jinping’s 
bolder intentions were clearly articulated 
in his speech at the Conference of Diplo-
matic Work Toward Surrounding Countries 
on October 24, 2013, in which he formally 
presented the strategy of “striving for 
achievement (fen fa you wei 奋发有为).”8 
According to Blackwill and Campbell, Xi’s 
assertive foreign policy has been carried 
out most explicitly in the South China Sea.9 
Chinese coast guard vessels’ harassment of 
Philippine and Vietnamese fishermen and 
repeated encroachment into Malaysia’s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) all illustrate 
China’s determination to secure its claim to 
this maritime territory.10 
As a part of this new active foreign policy 
strategy, China has also started to establish 
multilateral institutions and regimes exclud-
ing the U.S. in an attempt to inject Chinese 
elements into the existing international 
order. These include the Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and 
the New Development Bank – the Chinese 
equivalents of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and the World Bank, respectively – as 
well as the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank. China can utilize these multilateral 
organizations as a means of exerting 
political leverage on participating Asian 
countries, just as it did when it withdrew 
approval for a multilateral development 
plan for India because of its protracted 
territorial disputes with the country.11
Several factors account for this shift toward 
more audacious foreign policy behav-
ior. Xi’s own nationalistic inclinations are 
almost certainly one of them, and espe-
cially make sense in the context of his 
increased personal influence over China’s 
foreign policy-making process. On the 
other hand, because China’s economic 
growth has begun to slow down, the Chi-
nese Communist Party seems to be relying 
more heavily on nationalism to preserve its 
political legitimacy. Moreover, the fact that 
China weathered the 2008 global financial 
crisis better than many other countries may 
have boosted its leaders’ confidence in their 
country’s potential and capabilities, con-
vincing them that China is powerful enough 
to become the rule-maker, rather than a pas-
sive participant, of the international order.12
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Implications for the United 
States, China, and the World
As China makes bolder attempts to pro-
tect its national interests and increase its 
political clout in Asia through its own mul-
tilateral institutions, one of the most viable 
and appropriate policy options for the U.S. 
would be to continue its “rebalance” to 
Asia. By strengthening its diplomatic, mil-
itary, and economic relations with Asian 
countries, the U.S. should seek to prevent 
China from winning strategic ground and 
strive to maintain its primacy in the region.13 
Some may argue that this process would 
involve an escalation of conflict that would 
result in a major confrontation between the 
two countries, but this outcome is highly 
unlikely, given that the U.S. and China are 
highly dependent on each other for sus-
tainable economic growth.14
This foreign policy shift also has implica-
tions for China. Unfortunately, the new 
assertive foreign policy does not seem to 
have generated favorable outcomes for 
China, as can be seen from: the nullifica-
tion of Chinese “historical rights” within the 
“Nine-Dash Line” by the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration in The Hague; South Korea’s 
decision to deploy the Terminal High Alti-
tude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile 
system (THAAD); Japan’s reinterpretation 
of its constitution to allow for collective 
self-defense; and the 2015 U.S.-Japan 
defense guidelines that assigned a 
wider regional security role to Japan.15 
These repeated foreign policy failures 
may prompt Chinese leaders to examine 
whether their assertive behavior is harming 
China’s national interests by intimidating or 
provoking its neighbors, leading them to 
militarize and to align more closely to the 
U.S. Thus, the durability of this new policy 
stance remains to be seen.
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China has set ambitious goals for reducing 
its energy intensity, and has made renew-
able energy an important part of the plan. 
Over the last few years, China’s installed 
capacity of renewable energy, especially 
wind power, has grown rapidly. China now 
has the world’s largest installed capacity 
of wind power and plans further develop-
ment of the industry.1 However, looking at 
the bigger picture, we find that the whole 
industry is not as clean as first assumed: 
the production of neodymium magnets, a 
key component of wind turbines, involves 
substantial polluting activities through the 
extraction and processing of rare-earth 
metals. While it is generally understood 
that wind power is clean and rare-earth 
processing is dirty, few studies have linked 
them together. This report aims to establish 
the connection and provide a preliminary 
assessment of the wind industry’s true 
impact on China’s environment.2
Upstream pollution in the  
wind industry
Renewable energy has a reputation for 
being “green” because it transforms natural 
resources into electricity without green-
house gas emissions. Wind power has 
minor negative environmental and ecolog-
ical impacts, which include noise, land use, 
and limited electromagnetic radiation.3 As 
a result, governments around the world are 
promoting wind power, together with other 
renewables, to curb fossil fuel emissions.
In 2012, wind surpassed nuclear to become 
the third largest source of China’s electricity 
generation, following coal and hydropower. 
China has developed the world’s largest 
wind power capacity, concomitantly build-
ing a supply chain to meet the demand for 
wind turbines both at home and abroad.4 
China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan encour-
ages this development by setting goals for 
a low-carbon economy, addressing pollu-
tion, and requiring structural adjustments 
for industry. In the eyes of the government, 
wind power is set to light up the future of 
China’s electricity market because of its 
environment-friendly characteristics.
Nonetheless, if we calculate the environ-
mental footprint of wind power including 
wind turbine production, we find that wind 
power makes significant if unseen contri-
butions to environmental damage. The 
upstream production of wind turbines 
involves massive polluting activities in the 
construction of the turbines’ magnetic core. 
When the blades of a turbine are driven by 
the wind, a shaft is turned and spins the 
magnet in the generator.  An electric current 
is created through electromagnetism and 
sent to the transmission grid. The magnet 
in a permanent magnet direct-drive gen-
erator is made of a neodymium-iron-boron 
alloy. It is the most powerful magnet in the 
world and ensures the high efficiency of 
the aero generator. It is called a permanent 
magnet because its magnetism will never 
fade. The problem is that neodymium is 
a light rare-earth metal that requires an 
involved process of extraction and refining 
to produce. Massive polluting activities are 
a byproduct of the process.
According to a White Paper issued by 
China’s State Council in 2012, the rare-
earth industry causes severe damage to 
the environment: 
Outdated production processes and tech-
niques in the mining, dressing, smelting 
and separating of rare earth ores have 
severely damaged surface vegetation, 
caused soil erosion, pollution, and acidi-
fication, and reduced or even eliminated 
food crop output...Light rare earth mines 
usually contain many associated metals, 
and large quantities of toxic and hazardous 
gases, waste water with high concentration 
of ammonium nitrogen and radioactive res-
idues are generated during the processes 
of smelting and separating. In some places, 
the excessive rare earth mining has resulted 
in landslides, clogged rivers, environmen-
tal pollution emergencies, and even major 
accidents and disasters, causing great 
damage to people’s safety and health, and 
the ecological environment. At the same 
time, the restoration and improvement of 
the environment has also heavily burdened 
some rare-earth production areas.5 
Pollution on what scale?
According to China’s Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection (MEP), in 2011 there were 
more than 300 enterprises in the rare-earth 
industry. Most firms are located in Inner 
Mongolia, Jiangxi, Guangdong, Jiangsu, 
Fujian, Hunan, Shandong, Guangxi, and 
Sichuan Provinces. Violations of environ-
mental regulations have been common 
across the industry, including projects 
and operations without environmental 
protection permits, emissions of untreated 
solid, hazardous and/or radioactive waste, 
and ecological damage due to careless 
extraction. Starting in April 2011, provin-
cial environmental protection departments 
investigated the industry and reported that 
just 84 companies passed their examination. 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection 
ran further assessments and found that 
only 15 enterprises met environmental 
protection standards.6 While the industry 
has improved, with 87 enterprises meeting 
environmental standards in 2013, two out 
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Due to a lack of comprehensive assess-
ments of contamination in the rare-earth 
industry, a discussion of two representa-
tive cities where most rare-earth permanent 
magnet materials are manufactured, Gan-
zhou in Jiangxi Province and Baotou in 
Inner Mongolia, will serve to underscore 
the environmental impact of the industry.8
Ganzhou, the largest city in Jiangxi Province, 
is the southern center of China’s rare-earth 
reserves. In 2011, over 70 percent of farm-
land in Ganzhou was polluted or damaged 
due to rare-earth extraction.9 Ammonium 
sulfate fluids are directly poured into the 
rare-earth mines to replace rare-earth 
oxides (REOs). The production of one ton 
of REOs is associated with injecting seven 
to eight tons of ammonium sulfate fluids 
into the earth, which can easily mix with 
surrounding ground water. The method 
also causes 300 cubic meters of soil deple-
tion and 2000 cubic meters of tailings, an 
industrial waste byproduct, to be created 
for every ton of REOs.10According to 
former Vice Minister Su Bo of the Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIT), the pollution treatment budget for 
the Ganzhou area is 38 billion RMB. The 
annual profit of the rare-earth industry in 
Jiangxi Province was just 640 million RMB 
in 2011.11 
The city of Baotou in Inner Mongolia, known 
as “the capital of rare-earths” in China, has 
the world’s largest rare-earth reserves in its 
Bayan Obo mineral district. During decades 
of operation, the state-owned Baotou Iron 
and Steel company released a tailings pond 
into a ten square kilometer lake, contain-
ing many toxic chemicals and radioactive 
elements like thorium and uranium. The 
tailings lake is only about 12 kilometers 
away from Baotou and nine kilometers 
away from the Yellow River. It slowly trick-
les underground toward the Yellow River, 
and when the rainy season comes every 
July and August, pollutants quickly flood 
into the Yellow River through  tributaries 
flowing from the lake. Various reports and 
official studies confirm unusually high rates 
of cancer, osteoporosis, and skin and respi-
ratory diseases in villages surrounding 
Baotou.12 Local governments have been 
forced to evacuate and resettle whole vil-
lages between the city of Baotou and the 
Yellow River as a result.13
While the precise share of rare-earth 
mining attributable to the wind industry is 
unavailable, a U.S. Geological Survey esti-
mates neodymium ore accounts for around 
20 percent of China’s national rare-earth 
reserves.14 Based on this estimate, roughly 
one-fifth of the pollution treatment costs 
from rare-earth mining are associated with 
neodymium permanent magnet production. 
Rare-earth regulations 
and their effects 
Severe and pervasive polluting activities in 
the rare-earth industry are the outcome of 
poor regulation. The Ministry of Land and 
Resources (MLR) has been responsible 
for developing production plans for the 
country’s strategic commodities, including 
rare-earth metals. However, decentraliza-
tion in regulating the rare-earth industry 
led to the MLR delegating authority to 
provincial governments to manage local 
production quota allocations and assign 
output quotas to individual mining compa-
nies. Overproduction and direct emissions 
from both licensed and unlicensed miners 
have resulted in disastrous pollution due to 
poorly implemented regulations.15 
In 2008, the Rare-Earth Office was trans-
ferred out of the MLR and centralized in 
MIIT. After the MEP investigation in 2011, 
a series of regulatory actions were under-
taken and policy documents were released. 
Most of the unlicensed mines were penal-
ized and closed, despite some pushback 
from local interest groups. The MIIT also 
supervised a restructuring of the whole 
industry. Many inefficient small companies 
and other state-owned enterprises were 
integrated into a group of six major rare-
earth firms, in the hope that consolidation 
would make it easier to regulate the con-
tamination problem.16 In 2012, the MIIT 
issued the country’s first Rare-Earth Indus-
try Entry Standards, in which sections five, 
seven, and eight state that all enterprises in 
the industry must comply with regulations 
in Emission Standards of Pollutants from 
the Rare-Earths Industry Guidance policy 
document and that related government 
branches must strictly enforce relevant 
environmental and security rules.17 The 
MEP also conducted a three-year study 
on possible technological upgrades to 
reduce pollutant emissions from rare-earth 
mining and their economic feasibility. In 
2014, the MEP released a draft regulation 
titled Guidelines on Available Technologies 
of Pollution Prevention and Control for the 
Rare-Earth Metallurgical Industry, and is still 
in the process of taking advice from the 
whole industry and concerned parties.18 
When and how these regulations will be 
implemented is still unclear.
The big question is how the government will 
next follow up after the major crackdown in 
2011-12. Proposed reforms are attractive at 
the policy level, yet are unclear on imple-
mentation and enforcement mechanisms. 
Worse still is that existing enterprises, 
including some state-owned giants, con-
tinue to pollute and some previously 
eliminated producers have re-entered the 
market. According to the U.S. Geological 
Survey’s 2016 Mineral Commodity Sum-
maries, despite government efforts, illegal 
production of rare-earth materials in China 
is ongoing.19 In January 2015, local villagers 
reported the Ganzhou Rare-Earth Mineral 
Corporation’s Jibu Mine had re-opened 
after a four-year suspension, even though 
questionable mining activities had never 
stopped and the firm never passed an offi-
cial environmental assessment.20 
For the most part, large state-owned 
enterprises are rarely held responsible for 
violations of environmental regulations, 
and they continue to emit untreated pol-
lutants despite repeated criticism. Since 
2007, the Aluminum Corporation of China 
and its subsidiaries around the country 
have been named and condemned by the 
State Environmental Protection Administra-
tion (predecessor of the MEP) and many 
news agencies. In January 2015, residents 
in Buning, Jiangsu Province reported the 
company’s pollution problem to the MEP.21 
In the case of the Ganzhou Rare-Earth Min-
eral Corporation, failure to obtain an entry 
permit from the MIIT quashed its plan to 
go public in 2015. But its manufacturing 
activities continue unchanged.22 Senior 
executives claimed the financial burden 
imposed by environmental regulations 
was too large and required the company 
to go public in order to finance pollution 
treatment projects.23 
Environmental benefits from 
wind power development 
While the upstream industries are 
enmeshed in environmental damage, 
wind power generation itself is not con-
tributing to clean energy consumption 
as expected. China has enjoyed the fast-
est pace of wind power development in 
the world over the last decade. However, 
skyrocketing installed capacity has done 
little to improve the industry’s efficiency. 
The main cause has been the state devel-
opment plan, which overlooked practical 
obstacles concerning market demand and 
technical shortcomings. Upstream polluting 
activities in wind turbine production have 
often ended up creating idle wind turbines. 
So far, the environmental impact of pursu-
ing wind has been net negative. 
The concept of curtailment refers to the 
problem that installed capacity cannot be 
fully connected to the power grid because 
of local market saturation or technical short-
comings in interconnecting power grids. In 
China, some 80 percent of onshore wind 
energy capacity is in the “Three Norths” 
region — an area ranging from Xinjiang 
to Heilongjiang (the north, northeast and 
northwest of China). Yet 70 percent of total 
demand lies in central and coastal China. 
Is the Wind Industry Helping China’s Environment? A Preliminary Environmental Impact Report
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The distance between the best resources 
for renewable energy generation and the 
main areas of demand is a major obstacle 
since new transmission and distribution 
capacity entails a large upfront invest-
ment.24 The power grid in the “Three 
Norths” is not sophisticated enough to dis-
patch large amounts of electricity through 
high-voltage, long-distance lines. More-
over, wind power competes with traditional 
fossil fuel-generated electricity for limited 
dispatch volume. In 2015, some wind 
power plants in the “Three Norths” had an 
average idle rate of up to 50 percent, which 
caused an annual loss of more than 43 mil-
lion RMB.25 Industry rumors have cradled 
an expectation that the government could 
order a guaranteed quota for wind power 
to be dispatched to eastern and southern 
markets through high-voltage transmission 
grids, yet interest groups have made it hard 
to reach an agreement on volume. In 2016, 
electricity demand dropped in large areas 
of China as the economy slowed down. 
Wind power plants around the country 
were ordered to halt production so that 
local fossil fuel plants could earn a guaran-
teed share. The practice of giving priority to 
the development and utilization of renew-
able energy in the Renewable Energy Law 
was ironically overlooked.26 Although many 
wind power producers were running below 
their breakeven point, more than 31 mil-
lion kilowatts of wind power capacity were 
brought online in 2015, exacerbating the 
situation even further.27 
Conclusion and discussion 
At this point, we should not diminish the 
contribution of wind power as a clean 
energy capable of carbon emission reduc-
tion and air pollution control. Nonetheless, 
the positive effects might not be as promis-
ing as originally expected. Despite China’s 
ever-increasing wind power capacity, some 
wind-generated electricity has never 
successfully been connected to the trans-
mission system. On the down side, we do 
not know the exact costs associated with 
managing pollution in neodymium magnet 
generator production. The Ganzhou case 
clearly shows short-term treatment costs 
easily surpass the profits of the whole 
rare-earth industry in Jiangxi Province. As 
most wind power plants are experiencing 
deficits, the pollution costs have so far not 
been balanced out by the usage of clean 
power. In the past few years, we have seen 
some policies launched to make the wind 
industry a net positive for China’s environ-
ment, from both the upstream (rare-earth 
production) side and the downstream 
(market absorption) side. However, most 
of the major policies have had substantial 
implementation gaps. 
There is additional bad news for the 
Chinese wind power industry’s net envi-
ronmental impact. In 2015, excess supply 
caused prices for rare-earth compounds 
and metals to decline significantly, with 
illegal production in China a major cause.28 
In addition, rare-earth reserves are not as 
rare as their name suggests. New mineral 
sites have been discovered around the 
globe and China’s global share of rare-
earth minerals has decreased after years 
of unrestrained production.29 Future profits 
for China’s rare-earth industry are likely to 
fall, making it even harder to cover environ-
mental externalities. It is hard to estimate 
when China’s wind power industry will start 
to make profits. At least in the short run, 
including environmental externalities in the 
calculation of environmental gains shows 
that wind power development is causing 
more losses than gains in China. 
Importantly, this report does not recom-
mend the end of wind power development 
in China. Despite upstream pollution, wind 
power generation is still a promising tech-
nology that can mitigate pollution caused 
by using traditional fossil fuels. It is the 
policy and implementation side that the 
Chinese government must improve so 
that this perverse shortcoming of the wind 
power industry can be solved. 
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This analysis seeks to define and analyze 
the nuclear balance between the United 
States (U.S.) and the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) from the mid-1990s onward. 
Such an assessment is important given the 
increased capabilities of nuclear weapons 
systems and potential changes in the will-
ingness to use them since the mid-1990s. 
The U.S.-China nuclear balance has long 
favored the U.S., which has almost 30 
times the number of nuclear warheads of 
China.1 However, a full analysis of the bal-
ance includes more than just the number 
of warheads. Other factors such as the 
effectiveness of weapons systems, nature 
of nuclear doctrine, and outside political 
factors also influence the nuclear balance. 
Given these factors, the nuclear balance will 
start to equalize over the next few decades 
as the superiority gap continues to narrow.
How to think about the balance 
The nuclear balance is defined by nuclear 
weapons and doctrines. Nuclear weapons 
include both warheads and their delivery 
systems, while nuclear doctrine reflects 
each state’s willingness to use these weap-
ons. Both quantitative and qualitative 
factors therefore contextualize the bal-
ance. While primarily functional in nature, 
the nuclear balance also retains a geo-
graphic context given growing competition 
between the U.S. and China in East Asia. 
Although nuclear weapons have not been 
used since 1945, their ongoing presence 
serves as a means of strategic deterrence. 
The U.S. has never held a doctrine of 
no-first-use (NFU). President Obama 
maintained the U.S. precedent of non-
use against non-nuclear weapons states 
(NNWS) and against states party to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) in compliance with their 
non-proliferation obligations.2 However, 
the U.S. has not specified the nature of 
these non-proliferation obligations.
China has held a policy of NFU and assured 
retaliation, which is a strategy of guaran-
teed response, since the development of 
its first nuclear bomb in 1964.3 This commit-
ment to NFU, however, has recently come 
into question. A 2013 White Paper pub-
lished by China’s Ministry of Defense failed 
to address NFU for the first time since the 
initiation of China’s nuclear program. This 
omission of an explicit reference to NFU 
could signal the Chinese government’s shift 
toward a more offensive doctrine that could 
eventually include first use. It also leaves 
open to interpretation whether any sort of 
attack or threat of attack, conventional or 
nuclear, could provoke a Chinese strike. 
This potential move toward a more offen-
sive doctrine will shape the future of the 
nuclear balance, as it affects China’s deter-
rent and coercive capacity. 
In addition to nuclear doctrines, this 
assessment focuses on the moderniza-
tion of weapons and delivery systems. 
The U.S. military plans to update and 
modernize all three legs of its nuclear 
triad, including ballistic missile subma-
rines, strategic bombers, and land-based 
ballistic missiles over the next two to 
three decades. Most investments will be 
allocated to Minuteman intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Ohio-class 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and 
long-range strike (LRS) bombers. The top 
priorities are to increase precision, create 
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more mobile missile platforms, and force 
life extension.4
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) mod-
ernization efforts emphasize deliverability 
over effectiveness of warheads, as well as 
long-range capabilities. This has translated 
into an advancement in weapons mobility 
and fuel types as well as long/interconti-
nental-range and sea-based technology. 
In 2015, the PLA generated its first MIRV 
(multiple independently targetable reen-
try vehicle)-capable DF-5 ICBM. In 2016, 
it planned to deploy its new Jin-class JL-2 
armed SSBN on its first credible deterrent 
patrol in the Pacific.5 This deployment has 
yet to occur. Over the next 10 to 20 years, 
the PLA will continue to develop its long-
range, MIRV, and sea-based capabilities. 
The U.S. military will meanwhile keep mod-
ernizing its current nuclear triad. 
Comparing U.S.-China 
nuclear objectives
Both the U.S. and Chinese governments 
share the ultimate goal of deterring 
nuclear and conventional attacks. The PLA 
has typically followed a doctrine of “min-
imal deterrence.” That is, with its smaller 
nuclear arsenal, its objective has been to 
deter regional attacks while upholding a 
policy of NFU.6 The PLA’s modernization 
of the range and capacity of its weapons 
systems, as well as the obfuscation of its 
policy of NFU, however, surpasses mini-
mal deterrence. In order to have a more 
effective deterrent, the PLA continues to 
strive toward fortifying credible long-range/
intercontinental means. For this reason, 
the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) will main-
tain focus on developing SSBNs, SLBMs 
(submarine-launched ballistic missiles), 
and MIRV-capable ICBMs over the next 10 
to 20 years. Combining these new long-
range capabilities alongside its SRBMs and 
MRBMs will fortify the Chinese deterrent 
against a U.S. attack. 
The U.S. operates under a strategy of 
extended deterrence, striving to deter 
attacks on the homeland as well as 
against allies. It must be able to provide 
the weapons, doctrine, and posturing to 
such regional partners as Japan, South 
Korea (ROK), and Australia. This has trans-
lated into the presence of military bases 
and SSBNs in the Pacific and NATO (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization) missile bases 
throughout Europe. The U.S. must maintain 
forces that can project over medium and 
intercontinental ranges from land, sea, and 
air. Extended deterrence also requires the 
U.S. to keep open an option of first use. 
In addition to deterrence, China and the 
U.S. view the nuclear balance as a way 
to gain or obstruct access to the Pacific.7 
In the context of East Asian competition, 
bolstering its nuclear deterrent could aid 
the PLA in staving off U.S. primacy. One of 
President Xi’s primary interests is to assert 
Chinese sovereignty in the Pacific. This is 
especially pertinent to the U.S. presence 
and alliances in East Asia against the back-
drop of island disputes in the South and 
East China Seas and the Taiwan issue. With 
more effective nuclear forces and a more 
offensive doctrine, the PLA could poten-
tially impose this same nuclear-backed 
threat on Japan, Russia, India, and on 
China’s Southeast Asian neighbors. Con-
versely, the U.S. strives to counter China’s 
growing deterrent capacity and maintain 
a competitive advantage in the Pacific. 
Possessing both a qualitatively and quan-
titatively superior nuclear arsenal, as well 
as a doctrine reflecting the willingness to 
employ it, affords the U.S. more flexibility 
in pursuing its national interests. The 2009 
U.S. “pivot” to Asia includes this U.S. goal 
of retaining a relative deterrent and coer-
cive advantage in the Pacific in the wake of 
increasing Chinese assertiveness. 
The nuclear balance is also a tool for 
China’s larger objectives in line with its 
hegemonic ambitions. Garnering greater 
nuclear strength has become equated with 
national power and prestige. Under former 
statesman Deng Xiaoping, China operated 
under a national “hide and bide” strategy. 
Deng implemented internal economic 
reforms aimed at rapid growth without 
an emphasis on exerting external power. 
Xi has since emerged from and replaced 
this “hide and bide” strategy with that of 
the “China Dream.” The PRC now seeks to 
translate its internal reforms and strong 
economic growth into global influence. 
Increasing economic strength and nation-
alist sentiments underpin a reinvigorated 
Chinese commitment to continue devel-
oping nuclear forces over the next 10 to 
20 years. 
The U.S. and Chinese objective — to survive 
an initial attack and retain the ability to 
launch a counterstrike — also highlights the 
emphasis on the deliverability, survivability, 
and long-range capacity of nuclear forces. 
China, with less advanced forces, is now 
starting to develop and modernize these 
capabilities. MIRV-capable ICBMs are both 
long-range and allow for multiple targets. 
SSBNs are more difficult to detect and can 
be deployed around the world. The PLA 
has an underground missile transfer system 
that is estimated to be around 3,000 miles 
long.8 By assembling and transferring mis-
siles underground, the PLA and PLARF can 
better ensure the survivability and retalia-
tory ability of their forces. 
During the next 10 to 20 years, the U.S. will 
also continue to focus on long-range capa-
bilities and force survivability as a means to 
ensure retaliation. The U.S. has possessed a 
relatively strong triad force since the Cold 
War, as it held this same objective against 
the USSR. Over the past few years, the U.S. 
has begun deploying Terminal High Alti-
tude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic 
missile (ABM) systems alongside the ROK 
and NATO. These systems were originally 
created as a deterrent measure against 
Russia and North Korea (DPRK), but their 
range makes it possible to deploy them 
against a Chinese threat. If the PLARF 
were to launch a short- or medium-range 
ballistic missile at a U.S. base or ally, the 
U.S. could intercept the strike in its terminal 
phase.9 This would also allow for extended 
U.S. radar capabilities against a Chinese 
threat and leave open the option for a 
retaliatory measure. 
Measuring the balance
The nuclear balance must be measured 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. A 
quantitative approach includes the number 
of nuclear warheads and systems each side 
possesses. The qualitative aspect refers to 
the effectiveness of these weapons sys-
tems and nuclear doctrines. Effectiveness 
includes the deliverability and survivability 
of forces. 
The U.S. has and will continue to have a vast 
superiority in number of nuclear warheads. 
The U.S. is estimated to have roughly 7,100 
warheads while China has approximately 
260.10 This Chinese figure, however, is a 
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) esti-
mate. Lack of Chinese transparency makes 
it difficult to determine the exact size of 
its arsenal. It is unlikely that either coun-
try will manufacture more fissile material 
in the immediate future. China stopped 
producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) 
and plutonium in 1987 and 1989, and the 
U.S. ceased its own fissile material pro-
duction in 1992.11 While each military 
can adjust the number of warheads they 
possess by modifying warhead size, they 
are limited to their current stockpiles of 
fissile material. 
The U.S. will work toward reducing its war-
head stockpile through at least 2018 under 
the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty), which allows Russia and the U.S. only 
1,550 deployed warheads and 800 total 
ICBMs, SLBMs, and bomber launchers each.12 
Only 700 of these platforms can carry war-
heads. As of 2016, the USAF had 440 ICBMs, 
each deployed with one warhead.13 U.S. 
force size and composition have changed 
since 2010 under the New START, with an 
emphasis on retaining warheads for SSBNs 
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and ICBMs. By contrast, the DOD estimates 
that China has between 50 and 75 launchers 
for 75-100 ICBMs.14 The U.S. military has a 
much more developed nuclear triad with a 
greater quantity of every type of launcher.15
The U.S. has focused on long-range capa-
bilities since the initiation of its nuclear 
program during the Cold War, given the 
distance of the USSR from the U.S. The 
USAF first deployed MIRVs in 1970 on 
Minuteman III ICBMs, each outfitted with 
three warheads.16 Mobile ICBM platforms 
would improve the survivability of forces 
by making missiles more difficult to find 
and destroy.17 Existing silo-based Minute-
men III ICBMs are unable to be supported 
on mobile platforms in their current form. 
The complete modernization of Minutemen 
III, including making them mobile-capa-
ble, would necessitate $62.3 billion over 
the next 30 years.18 All USAF Minuteman 
ICBMs will need updates by 2030.19 
The PLA acknowledges that it will not reach 
numerical superiority against the U.S. It 
therefore seeks technological equity. At 
the beginning of its modernization pro-
gram in the mid-1990s, the PLA initially 
moved toward constructing smaller, tacti-
cal-use warheads.20 These warheads have 
since been used alongside the PLARF’s 
2015 development of its first MIRV-capa-
ble ICBM. The ability to launch multiple 
targeted warheads at once increases the 
deliverability of Chinese weapons as well as 
their deterrent capacity. Although Chinese 
missiles and warheads remain unmated in 
times of peace, modernization of select 
forces has included a switch from liquid 
to solid fuels in order to decrease launch 
times.21 The PLA has recently developed 
DF-41 and DF-5 missiles which use solid 
fuels, are precision-guided, and can be 
launched on a mobile rail car platform.22 
Despite ongoing research and develop-
ment (R&D) over the past few decades, 
the PLA Navy (PLAN) has yet to possess 
an operative SSBN fleet. It was expected 
to deploy its first credible deterrent patrol 
in 2016 with its new Jin-class SSBNs armed 
with JL-2 SLBMs, but has yet to do so.23 
Unlike current Chinese submarines, the 
Jin-class SSBNs possess advanced tech-
nology. The PLAN has six SSBNs in service 
with eight more planned over the next few 
years.24 SSBNs are difficult to detect and 
have a greater chance of survivability com-
pared to conventional submarines.25 
The effectiveness of SSBNs is also crucial for 
the U.S. in determining the nuclear balance 
against China. In addition to their stealth, 
their long range and mobility assist the U.S. 
goal of extended deterrence. The U.S. Navy 
has 14 SSBNS, nine of which are currently 
deployed in the Pacific.26 The Ohio-class 
SSBN fleet is set to begin retiring in 2027, 
thus requiring some sort of replacement 
over the next 10 to 20 years.27 The Chinese 
will continue to push the development of 
long-range and sea-based platforms as U.S. 
systems start to retire. 
Another effective measure of the balance 
over the next few decades is the ability of 
the U.S. and PRC governments to fund their 
nuclear programs. Both countries face dif-
ferent conditions restricting their abilities 
to fund nuclear and military initiatives. The 
table (shown on the right) gives an objec-
tive side-by-side comparison of some of 
the key macro-indicators in each country.28 
U.S. nuclear spending primarily comes 
from the Department of Energy (DOE). The 
DOE requested $20.5 billion in FY17 for 
nuclear weapons modernization, research, 
development, and safety.29 $674 million of 
this nuclear spending is mandatory, and 
not subject to Congressional approval.30 
The Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) reports that U.S. nuclear spending 
is roughly 3.3 percent of total national 
defense spending. Overall U.S. defense 
spending constitutes around 3.4 percent 
of the federal budget.31 Analyzing trends in 
the defense budget, the base budget (not 
including Overseas Contingency Operation 
war funds) has generally increased since the 
mid-1990s despite a decrease in the active 
duty force.32 The U.S. military has therefore 
shown a willingness to augment spending 
in areas of R&D, technology, modernization, 
and weapons procurement. Former Secre-
tary of Defense Ashton Carter estimated 
in 2016 that nuclear modernization costs 
over the next 20 to 30 years will amount 
to around $350-450 billion.33 The U.S. has 
always held an advantage with its triad 
systems, which are all set to retire during 
the same 10 to 20-year period. Future triad 
investments will continue to remain com-
petitive against Chinese efforts.
Chinese nuclear and defense spending is 
more complex. The Chinese government 
lacks transparency in its defense activities, 
including its nuclear force size and spend-
ing. The DOD therefore makes its own 
evaluations regarding Chinese weapons 
and fiscal means. The Chinese government 
purposely hides and releases false informa-
tion to stymie the DOD’s ability to measure 
capabilities, thus making it more difficult 
for the U.S. to plan and invest resources to 
counter China. The DOD estimated FY2015 
Chinese military spending at $180 billion.34 
This constitutes 2.1 percent of Chinese 
GDP that year, compared to 3.4 percent in 
the U.S.35 Although the U.S. and China have 
similar 2015 GDPs (in purchasing power 
parity/PPP terms), the U.S. continues to 
spend both a larger nominal amount and 
a larger percentage of GDP on defense. 
Due to a lack of transparency, there are no 
concrete figures on how much the Chinese 
government allocates to nuclear spending. 
Its budget could also be configured differ-
ently than the U.S., which divides spending 
between the DOD and DOE. 
The process of appropriating nuclear and 
military funds could also differ. The Cen-
tral Military Commission of the Communist 
Party of China (CMC), with President Xi as its 
Chairman, holds jurisdiction over the PLA. 
The military budget is created through a 
collaborative process between the PLA, the 
CMC, and the Ministry of Finance.36 The 
president therefore has a more direct role 
in approving the budget. Trends in Chinese 
military spending also coincide with trends 
in national economic growth. 2016 marked 
a significantly lower increase in the Chinese 
military budget at 7.6 percent, compared to 
10.7 percent growth in 2013, 12.4 percent 
in 2014, and 10 percent in 2015.37 Since 
2013, Chinese GDP growth has followed 
a similar trend, and recently slowed to less 
than 7 percent.38 The future nuclear bal-
ance will depend on the ability of China 
and the U.S. to provide continuous funds 
for their respective projected moderniza-
tion programs. 
Finally, collective defense alliances are 
an additional consideration in measuring 
the nuclear balance. The U.S. has several 
Comparative Macro-Indicators 2015
Macro-Indicators U.S. China
GDP (PPP) $18 trillion $19.4 trillion
Armed Forces 1.4 million 2.33 million
Defense Expenditures $601 billion ≈$180 billion
Population 324 million 1.4 billion
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collective security agreements in the Pacific 
and is a member of NATO. It has bilateral 
collective security arrangements with 
Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, Australia, 
and Thailand. These agreements emphasize 
the geographical element of the balance as 
they extend U.S. deterrence. In addition, as 
a means to deter DPRK aggressions in the 
region, the U.S. deployed a THAAD ABM 
system within the ROK in 2016. The system 
can only intercept missiles in their termi-
nal phase, meaning it cannot stop missiles 
launched from China to the U.S., but can 
prevent short- and mid-range strikes.39  
NATO is another collective security alliance 
that emphasizes the geographic element 
of the nuclear balance. Under Article 5 of 
the NATO Treaty, NATO allies would be 
required to intervene should China attack 
the U.S. Seven NATO allies possess nuclear 
weapons either on their own or as a part 
of the NATO nuclear sharing program.40 
In July 2016, NATO declared its ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) shield operational. 
BMD radar and interceptors are based 
in Romania and Poland, respectively. The 
system is only able to intercept short- and 
mid-range threats coming from East Asia 
and the Middle East, before the missiles 
reenter the atmosphere.41 While the NATO 
system was originally installed as a deter-
rent against Russia and Iran, like the ROK 
system, it also serves as a deterrent against 
possible Chinese short- or mid-range 
attacks against U.S. allies and regional 
military bases. China does not have this 
same alliance and organizational network 
and therefore does not have the ability to 
launch missiles from different global bases. 
It also cannot call upon the same system 
of allies for deterrence and to assist in a 
potential conflict.        
With limited outside support in the face 
of an extended U.S. nuclear threat, China 
has turned to internal restructuring to 
improve the efficacy of its nuclear forces. 
At the end of 2015, Xi Jinping, as chairman 
of the CMC, officially inaugurated the cre-
ation of the PLARF to replace the Second 
Artillery Corps.42 Establishing the PLARF 
as its own independent military service 
branch demonstrates a growing empha-
sis on upholding an effective and efficient 
missile force. Xi sees the PLARF as the core 
of China’s deterrent strength, stating that 
“the PLA Rocket Force should strengthen…
trustworthy and reliable nuclear deterrence 
and nuclear counter-attack capabilities, 
intensify the construction of medium and 
long range precision strike power, and 
reinforce the strategic check-and-balance 
capability.”43 Xi interprets U.S.-sponsored 
ABM systems in the region as a threat. 
He believes their radars will track Chi-
nese military developments and further 
provoke DPRK aggression.44 Xi has since 
partnered with President Vladimir Putin of 
Russia to announce a joint missile-defense 
test in 2017.45 China acknowledges the 
advantage of the U.S.’ allies in supplying 
nuclear weapons and interceptors as well 
as extending the geography of the U.S. 
nuclear presence. It will thus continue to 
try to counterbalance this superiority by 
increasing the efficiency of its own forces.
Trends and asymmetries
Since the mid-1990s, several trends have 
emerged that contextualize the current bal-
ance. Both the U.S. and China have moved 
toward modernizing their arsenals. How-
ever, during the past 20 years, the PLA has 
made relatively greater gains in the devel-
opment of its platforms. Over the next 10 
to 20 years, U.S. SSBNs and MIRV-capable 
ICBMs will face more numerically and qual-
itatively equal Chinese counterparts. Both 
countries have also exhibited an ongoing 
willingness to maintain funding for weapons 
development and modernization programs. 
Overall, examining trends and asymmetries 
in the balance starting in the mid-1990s, 
the future of the balance will most likely 
witness a growing parity. Although the U.S. 
will continue to have a numerically greater 
arsenal, Chinese technological advance-
ments and willingness to allocate funds will 
start to close the superiority gap. 
Chinese nuclear modernization started in 
the mid-1990s. The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 
1995-1996 forced the Chinese government 
to acknowledge its inability to confront the 
U.S. given its forces at the time. Unable to 
compete with the quantitative and technical 
superiority of the U.S. and USSR, China’s 
commencement of its nuclear modern-
ization program in the 1990s emphasized 
compact, medium-range, and tactical-use 
warheads. Contemporary modernization 
efforts, such as the development of long-
range missile and naval-based delivery 
systems, have since demonstrated Chi-
na’s vision of technological parity with 
the U.S. Since 1996, the U.S. and China 
have both had moratoriums on testing 
nuclear weapons under the guidance 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty.46 Maintaining this moratorium on 
testing could indicate the confidence of 
the PLARF in its new and modernized 
weapons and systems. 
In terms of future weapons trends, the 
PLARF may increase its number of war-
heads over the next few decades. The initial 
focus of the PLA’s modernization program 
in the 1990s was to create smaller, more 
tactical-use warheads. These smaller war-
heads have now been fitted for use on new, 
MIRV-capable ICBMs. Using the DOD’s 
upper estimate that the PLARF has 100 
ICBMs and assuming each ICBM could 
carry three warheads, the PLARF could 
potentially expand its warhead inventory 
by 300 over the next few decades. 
Nuclear and military spending serve as 
both a way to measure the balance as well 
as to analyze its trends. Both DOD high and 
low estimates of Chinese defense spending 
from 1996-2007 far surpass PRC reports.47 
All figures indicate a steady increase in 
defense expenditures since 1996. While 
the exact amount of annual expenditures 
allotted to nuclear forces is unknown, this 
assessment assumes that nuclear funding 
follows the general trend of overall defense 
spending, as spending is highly correlated 
with Chinese economic growth over this 
period. This increase in spending has con-
sisted mainly of R&D and restructuring the 
PLA, both of which are expected to con-
tinue through at least 2020.48 Over the next 
10 to 20 years, increases in China’s nuclear 
and defense spending will be largely 
dependent on the rate of economic growth. 
                                                                                                                                 
The Second Artillery Corps/PLARF has dras-
tically improved missile capacity during the 
past 20 years.49 Missiles such as the JL-2 
and DF-31 deemed “developmental” and 
“becoming available” in 2007 are now in 
use. The CMC and the PLA will continue 
to emphasize long-range and sea-based 
means in order to increase deterrence 
against the U.S., expand theater-level 
military effectiveness, and achieve tech-
nological parity. The Chinese will keep 
working toward closing this technological 
and deployment gap. Closing this gap will 
give the Chinese greater deterrence capa-
bility against the U.S. and enable possible 
hegemonic ambitions in the region. 
In addition, since the 1990s, U.S. deterrent 
SSBN patrols have decreased.50 The size 
of the overall SSBN fleet has remained rel-
atively constant since around 2001. With 
heightening competition and tension in 
East Asia and the deployment of China’s 
Jin-class fleet, these U.S. Pacific deploy-
ments may increase in the future. The U.S. 
has shown a trend of continuous invest-
ment in the modernization of its already 
superior forces since the mid-1990s. 
The nuclear balance is not experiencing a 
growing asymmetry, but rather an emerg-
ing parity. The U.S. possesses more than 
enough nuclear warheads and weapons 
to cause irreversible damage to China. 
Technicians at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory estimate that between 10 and 
100 “significant” thermonuclear weapons 
could destroy the entire world.51 There 
are therefore diminishing returns within 
the U.S. arsenal. The USAF may have a 
substantially greater quantity of warheads 
and weapons, but only a small number is 
necessary to cause significant damage to 
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China. Having a numerical superiority is 
an important factor in assessing destruc-
tive capabilities, but the drastic difference 
between U.S. and Chinese arsenals is more 
symbolic than practical. 
There is a significant asymmetry, however, 
in the imbalance of information. The Chi-
nese government has purposely employed 
a strategy of concealing information.52 It is 
difficult for the U.S. government and mili-
tary to plan and invest resources without a 
concrete understanding of Chinese forces 
and probability of use.53 Conversely, the 
U.S. has become more transparent with 
information since the end of the Cold War. 
Arms limitation and reduction treaties with 
the USSR forced the U.S. to start reporting 
on and opening up its nuclear forces for 
inspections. The DOD and DOE are rela-
tively transparent when it comes to such 
metrics as force spending, weapons char-
acteristics and locations, and doctrine. 
The majority of U.S. nuclear R&D and man-
ufacturing occurs at national laboratories, 
specifically the Sandia, Los Alamos, and 
Oak Ridge National Laboratories. Most of 
the silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs are 
known to be situated around Malmstrom, 
Minot, and Warren Air Force Bases. The 
exact locations of Chinese nuclear research 
and deployment sites are unknown, 
contributing to the large asymmetry in 
information. The best estimates of force 
positioning come from satellite imagery 
and intelligence.54 The DOD postulates that 
eight of the PLARF’s missile facilities can 
launch ICBMs. The majority of these sites 
are assumed to be located in the eastern 
portion of China, close to Taiwan and the 
DPRK border.55 
All of the U.S.’ SSBNs port in Washington, 
Georgia, or Virginia. They are deployed at 
sea for 77 days at a time, and then spend 35 
days in port.56 The position of SSBNs during 
their patrols is unknown. Their mobility and 
stealth is what increases their survivability 
and contributes to their deterrent capacity. 
The PLAN has three SSBN ports at Qingdao, 
Dalian, and Hainan. The location of these 
ports has been confirmed largely using 
satellite imagery.57 
Strengths and weaknesses
The U.S. currently holds a relative strength 
in the U.S.-China nuclear balance. It has 
superior technology and experience using 
nuclear weapons and employing a strat-
egy of deterrence. However, as seen in 
recent trends, China is beginning to have 
a competitive advantage in the temporal, 
economic, and political elements of the 
nuclear balance. Embedded in former 
leader Deng’s “hide and bide” strategy, 
the Chinese government frequently puts 
its competitive goals in terms of its 5,000-
year history.58 The PLA sees time as a tool 
and an asset that it holds over its adver-
saries. It is willing to take as long as it 
needs to garner the necessary resources 
to achieve its objectives. Two or three more 
decades of weapons development seem 
minimal relative to the entire history and 
ascendancy of the Chinese empire. The 
centralized nature of the Chinese govern-
ment also allots greater flexibility to Xi – as 
both the PRC President and Chairman of 
the CMC – in modifying nuclear doctrine 
and allocating economic resources. While 
the U.S. may have a greater military budget, 
the challenge of ensuring these funds on 
an annual basis fosters greater uncertainty. 
A relative weakness of the PLA — and rel-
ative strength of the U.S. military — is the 
structure of their militaries and experiences 
with nuclear strategic competition. The 
USAF has better training and force plan-
ning than the PLARF. In addition to greater 
USAF experience from the Cold War, the 
relatively new PLARF is still reconfiguring its 
leadership and force hierarchy from that of 
the Second Artillery Corps.59 The U.S. mili-
tary and USAF also put a greater emphasis 
on confronting the “fog of war” in war plan-
ning. In its training exercises, the PLA tends 
to overemphasize formalism, making much 
of its training impractical.60 Finally, in the 
PLA, military leaders are inherently Com-
munist Party leaders as well.61 While this 
strong connectivity between the regime 
and the military may lower bureaucratic 
barriers to taking action, it could also have 
negative side effects. Discontent among 
the Chinese people toward the govern-
ment could translate into a distrust for 
the military. 
Implications
The U.S. holds the current advantage in the 
nuclear balance against China. The U.S. has 
a precedent of an offensive nuclear doctrine 
and holds superiority in both the number 
and quality of warheads and systems. This 
gap, however, will continue to close as 
the PLA develops new weapons systems, 
such as MIRV-capable ICBMs and credible 
deterrent SSBNs. While the disparity in the 
number of warheads is the most drastic, 
the difference in weapons systems is the 
true source of measuring nuclear force 
effectiveness. Effectiveness comes from 
the deliverability and survivability of forces, 
especially over long ranges. While the U.S. 
currently holds the edge on this front, the 
implications of the factors discussed in this 
analysis all suggest that Chinese modern-
ization efforts will increasingly move toward 
reaching parity over the next few decades. 
The U.S. also has an advantage given its 
extensive network of allies, particularly 
in East Asia. While this is susceptible to 
China’s expanding regional alliances, it 
is unlikely to change in the near future. 
These same alliances, however, will also 
continue to drive Chinese modernization 
efforts as well as raise the likelihood of a 
scenario involving indirect conflict. In the 
event of an adversarial confrontation, the 
U.S. and China will both likely be able to 
survive an initial attack as well as retaliate. 
Over the course of the fight — whether it be 
conventional or nuclear — however, the U.S. 
would still retain an advantage. The U.S. 
military has more experience dealing with 
deterrent and competitive strategies and 
has better overall training. The PLARF is still 
trying to reconfigure its command struc-
ture, duties, and relationships with other 
branches. However, this gap will increas-
ingly narrow as the PLA garners greater, 
more educated force members, and as the 
PLARF matures. 
The one major difficulty the U.S. will con-
tinue to face in assessing the nuclear 
balance is Chinese opacity. Almost all 
figures regarding spending, force size, 
and doctrinal characteristics have been 
purposely obfuscated by the Chinese 
government. This has forced the U.S. 
military and DOD to rely on intelligence, 
estimates, and satellite imagery for informa-
tion. Meanwhile, China enjoys fairly open 
availability of U.S. nuclear data, including 
location, number, and types of forces. The 
unattainability of this information will con-
tinue to stymy U.S. attempts at analyzing 
the balance.
The nuclear balance is primarily assessed 
through the deterrent power it allots to 
each country. While the U.S. will uphold 
its deterrent superiority in the imme-
diate future, China and the U.S. will 
gradually reach parity through changes 
to China’s doctrine and immense devel-
opments in its systems technologies. 
It is unlikely that the U.S. and China will 
directly engage in a nuclear conflict in the 
future. The most probable scenario leading 
to a confrontation between the U.S. and 
China would come from the U.S. being 
drawn into a regional conflict based on 
its international obligations. 
Looking toward the future, the U.S. has 
limited options. The U.S. already has an 
offensive doctrine and has continued 
modernizing its nuclear weapons sys-
tems and warheads. Moving away from 
either of these actions could poten-
tially decrease tensions with the PRC, 
but would come at the expense of U.S. 
deterrent strength and primacy in East 
Asia. As the PLA strives toward parity with 
the U.S., the U.S.’ main advantage will lie 
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with its extensive alliance network. Over 
the next 10 to 20 years, the U.S. will main-
tain superiority in the nuclear balance; 
this advantage, however, will gradually 
decrease as the PLA progresses toward 
doctrinal and technological parity with 
the U.S.
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China continue to prohibit FDI in numerous 
sectors, market entry in China was com-
paratively faster due to the creation and 
proliferation of Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) along the coast in the early 1980s. 
Equally important, however, is India’s lack 
of national and local-level government ini-
tiatives to attract diaspora-led investment, 
compared to a much more robust set of 
diaspora-oriented initiatives in China.
China’s diaspora  
investment strategy
Prior to 1978, China’s Communist Party 
leadership made no attempt to utilize its 
overseas networks as a source of FDI. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, barriers to migration 
were imposed both locally and nationally. 
Private citizens were also unable to apply 
for passports, making legal emigration 
and outbound travel from China extremely 
limited in the 30 years prior to economic 
reform. The centrally-planned economy 
and extinction of private enterprise in Main-
land China severed existing ties to overseas 
Chinese business and investment.
One important consequence of the lib-
eralization policies of the 1980s was the 
increased mobility of China’s workforce. In 
1986, national ID cards were introduced, 
and individuals were able to apply for a per-
sonal passport (as opposed to military or 
diplomatic passports) for the first time since 
the establishment of the People’s Repub-
lic of China (PRC).6 In addition, contractual 
employment began to replace lifelong ten-
ured positions in state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), and the explosion of public, private, 
and mixed ownership businesses along the 
coastal provinces dramatically increased 
the flow of internal migration.
Under Deng Xiaoping, the PRC made a 
decisive shift in policy from ignoring and 
politically shaming overseas Chinese to 
actively engaging with China’s diaspora.7 
The Ministry of Education signed bilateral 
initiatives with several countries (including 
the United States) to increase the number of 
Chinese students and researchers abroad. 
China intensified efforts to combine senti-
ment and incentives to attract investment 
from China’s diaspora networks in other 
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Introduction
Given that China and India have the world’s 
largest and second-largest populations 
respectively, it comes as little surprise that 
the two countries also possess the world’s 
two largest diaspora networks. These net-
works are estimated at over 50 million 
overseas Chinese and over 25 million 
overseas Indians.1 These estimates reflect 
the broad definition of a diaspora; that is, 
those who are ethnically Chinese or Indian 
but who were not necessarily born in China or 
India, including descendants of Chinese and 
Indian emigrants. The numerical difference 
between China and India’s diaspora and the 
first-generation emigrants is vast; while China 
has a much larger multi-generation diaspora 
network, India has a larger emigrant popu-
lation. UN data estimated this population at 
roughly 9.5 million for China and 15.5 mil-
lion for India in 2015.2 While first-generation 
emigrant networks are the basis of the flow 
of remittances, multi-generational diasporas 
are critical in generating formal foreign direct 
investment. This paper will rely on the broad, 
multi-generational definition of “diaspora” 
in comparing how China and India have 
engaged with their overseas communities 
at both the national and local levels.
Comparative trends in foreign 
direct investment
Since embarking on economic reforms 
to open its economy to foreign trade and 
investment in the late 1970s, China has 
attracted far more foreign direct investment 
(FDI) than India. Part of this discrepancy is 
due to the timeline of economic liberal-
ization; China began the reform process 
more than a decade before India, particu-
larly with respect to market entry for foreign 
investors. However, during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, China’s and India’s eco-
nomic reforms were “highly comparable,” 
and China experienced a period of reform 
stagnation following the events of 1989 
while India’s reforms continued following 
its 1991 economic crisis.3 Nevertheless, 
China became a larger destination for 
FDI, and this investment has created a 
snowball effect in China’s development 
that has not been mirrored in India (with 
the exception of industry-specific FDI in 
IT and telecommunications). 
Another explanation for the sustained gap 
in FDI inflows is the degree to which the 
Chinese government has courted dias-
pora investors, principally through the 
Chinese-speaking diaspora networks in 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and North America. 
Until recently, the primary sources of FDI in 
Mainland China were Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
and Singapore.4 FDI was a major factor in 
China’s emergence as a manufacturing 
powerhouse in the 1990s and 2000s, and 
as much as half of that FDI was estimated 
to originate within the Chinese diaspora.5 
In contrast, through the 1990s and 2000s 
India received less than one-tenth of China’s 
FDI inflows, and in 2015 still received less 
than one-fifth of China’s incoming FDI ($44 
billion to $250 billion, respectively). Some 
of this difference can be attributed to the 
rate of liberalization; while both India and 
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The increased role of local governments in 
attracting FDI created competition among 
China’s provinces, instigating a cycle of 
liberalizing reforms in which the country’s 
largest cities contended for contracts with 
international investors. 
In the past decade, China’s efforts to ben-
efit economically from its diaspora have 
included both transnational engagement 
initiatives and incentives for high-skill work-
ers to return. Researcher Bo Xiang notes 
that new diaspora engagement initiatives 
were created at the national and local 
levels to target “new migrants,” or those 
who had emigrated from China in the last 
twenty to thirty years.15 For example, in the 
2000s, the national government launched 
a program to attempt to shift labor-in-
tensive manufacturing investment away 
from coastal provinces to its underdevel-
oped western provinces. Simultaneously, 
coastal provinces and autonomous cities 
have leaned on their diaspora networks to 
spur investment and technology transfer 
for capital-intensive manufacturing. The 
national government also encourages 
temporary visits from diaspora members 
by creating visa categories for Chinese emi-
grants and their descendants (something 
India has also done), and by organizing 
conferences to connect overseas Chinese 
with employment and investment oppor-
tunities. The “Thousand Talents Program” is 
one of several government initiatives that 
seek to bring overseas academics and 
researchers back to China.16 The initiatives 
are part of a much larger strategy (at both 
national and local levels) to reverse China’s 
“brain drain” and incentivize the return of 
China’s most educated and entrepreneurial 
diaspora members.
India’s absence of diaspora 
investment strategy
Much like China, the Indian government did 
not see its global diaspora as an asset until 
after it began the process of market lib-
eralization. According to a 2004 Migration 
Policy Institute (MPI) report, “Well within the 
past decade, the government of India has 
moved from a position of somewhat disap-
proving indifference toward the worldwide 
Indian diaspora to one of actively seeking 
their involvement in India’s development. 
It has followed a multi-prong strategy, 
pursuing portfolio investment, direct invest-
ment, technology transfer and trade links 
through the Diaspora.”17 Although the 
Indian government’s diaspora engagement 
has certainly come a long way in the last 
twenty years, it is still far from formalizing 
an FDI engagement strategy similar to that 
of China. That same MPI report later states 
that “the 20 million Indians abroad gener-
ate an annual income equal to 35 percent 
of India’s GDP, yet have generated less 
than 10 percent of India’s rather modest 
$4 billion of FDI — in contrast to the over-
seas Chinese, who, as noted above, have 
contributed half of China’s $48 billion.”18 
This gap has not gone unnoticed by Indian 
policymakers. Over the past two decades, 
national leaders from both the Congress 
Party and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have 
called for deeper outreach with the Indian 
diaspora and an overall improvement in 
India’s unwieldy investment climate.
In 1998, the State Bank of India issued 
government bonds exclusively for Indi-
ans living abroad (called Non Residential 
Indians, or NRI). The bonds offered a 2 per-
cent higher interest rate than U.S. bonds 
and were exempt from India’s income 
and wealth taxes. Since the first round of 
investment, India has offered two more 
bond issues exclusively for NRIs. A 2002 
report from the LM Singhvi Committee 
(convened to consider the role of NRIs 
in India’s development) placed blame on 
the national government for ignoring the 
potential economic gains from its diaspora. 
The report identified two factors that have 
prevented diaspora members from invest-
ing in India: unmanageable bureaucracy 
and pervasive corruption. Although China’s 
government faces similar issues, the Indian 
context is far graver; the decentralized 
nature of India’s governance structure has 
patriotic duty while offering generous tax 
breaks to potential overseas Chinese inves-
tors. According to You-tien Hsing, diaspora 
FDI became an overwhelming source of 
foreign investment following the Tianan-
men Square incident, after which China 
was subject to economic sanctions from 
Western nations and capital flight from Jap-
anese and other investors.8 In this sense, 
government initiatives to attract investment 
from overseas Chinese recognized the abil-
ity of diaspora members, despite political 
and bureaucratic difficulties, to operate 
within China with greater ease than foreign 
investors. Diaspora-led FDI is seen as reli-
able, sustainable, and long-term, whereas 
foreign investment is more contingent on 
current events and market fluctuations.9
Local-level networks and government 
initiatives may have been even more 
important than national policies in attract-
ing diaspora investment. During periods of 
ongoing market liberalization in the 1980s 
and 1990s, provincial governments began 
utilizing diaspora networks to capture FDI, 
particularly in the construction of new fac-
tories and trade infrastructure. The most 
obvious examples are in China’s southern 
provinces (most notably Guangdong Prov-
ince), the origin of the majority of overseas 
Chinese prior to the beginning of the Cul-
tural Revolution in 1966. When the Chinese 
economy opened in the late 1970s, these 
provinces were the first to attract overseas 
investment due to their preexisting dias-
pora networks in other Asian countries, as 
well as their proximity to Hong Kong.
The diaspora played a vocal role in the 
selection of China’s first Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs): it was precisely due to the 
preexistence of local-level diaspora net-
works in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, 
and the U.S. that several cities in Guang-
dong were selected.10 Entrepreneurial local 
officials in China reduced and streamlined 
regulations for foreign investment, and 
provided tax incentives at the city and 
province-level specifically for Taiwanese 
investors. This adaptability yielded results, 
as FDI from Taiwan soared in localities pro-
viding these incentives.11 Compared to the 
national government, local officials were 
more effective in building on the ancestral 
links of diaspora members to attract FDI for 
development at the city or province level.
For the first two decades of liberalization, 
the principal source of incoming FDI in 
China was not the West, but rather indus-
trialized Asian countries with large ethnic 
Chinese populations. Hong Kong and 
Taiwan are, of course, most evident in also 
being “Chinese,” but Singapore, Australia, 
and South Korea also played significant 
roles in providing early investment to small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) along Chi-
na’s coast. By 1994, roughly $69 billion USD 
had been invested in Mainland China by 
167,000 foreign firms, but less than half of 
these companies were from Japan, Europe, 
or the United States.12 Overseas Chinese 
communities in Asian countries, rather than 
diaspora networks in the West, provided 
the pivotal early FDI flows that led the PRC 
to further liberalize its capital markets and 
foreign ownership requirements. In this 
sense, the Asia-based Chinese diaspora 
was essential in changing international 
perceptions about China as an unsafe 
investment destination.13 
In the late 1990s, Western FDI returned as 
China once again became a politically and 
economically “safe” investment destination. 
With the explosive growth of the country’s 
middle class, foreign businesses sought to 
meet China’s growing demand for more 
diverse products. This investment growth 
was still diaspora-led, with an estimated 
half of the $48 billion dollars in FDI that 
flowed into China in 2002 originating with 
the Chinese diaspora.14 The Chinese gov-
ernment, as the result of its accession to the 
WTO, further reformed its trade and invest-
ment laws, creating tax incentives for FDI 
in specific provinces in the country. Local 
governments in major cities like Shanghai 
and Guangzhou offered further tax credits, 
reduced transaction costs, and stream-
lined regulations for foreign investors. 
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than Indian emigrants.23 However, his argu-
ment is largely inconsistent with the role 
India’s emigrants have played in the U.S. 
and elsewhere. In high-income countries, 
Chinese and Indian emigrants actually enter 
similar professions, such as IT, engineer-
ing, and medicine. In the U.S., more Indian 
emigrants have held senior management 
positions than their Chinese counterparts, 
most likely because of the lack of a lan-
guage barrier and the role Indians have 
played in founding and expanding U.S. 
technology companies. Business leaders 
are better positioned than engineers and 
scientists to direct investment back to their 
country of origin, so India’s entrepreneur-
ship in the U.S. should translate to greater 
FDI in India. 
Similarly, India has a more open capital 
market than China, which continues to use 
significant capital controls to manage its 
exchange rate. While neither country has 
a particularly advanced set of laws pro-
tecting the rights of foreign-owned firms 
or intellectual property, India has a more 
transparent judicial system that is more 
likely to protect foreign investment. China, 
by contrast, has used its judicial system to 
force foreign firms to share intellectual 
property and continues to require mixed 
ownership for foreign firms operating in 
many sectors.24 All of this would suggest a 
more attractive climate for FDI in India than 
in China. Why, then, does China continue 
to receive four times India’s FDI?
Although it is difficult to compare trends 
in FDI between two emerging countries, 
India and China provide strong examples of 
how government engagement with its dias-
pora can impact economic development. 
While China has pursued an active diaspora 
outreach strategy since early in its reform 
period, India has done very little to attract 
and simplify diaspora-led investment. The 
modest gains made in India’s investment 
climate in the 1990s and 2000s were not 
so much a testament to government flexi-
bility as they were a result of the tenacity of 
India’s diaspora. Rather than identifying the 
development potential of diaspora-led FDI, 
the Indian government has instead focused 
on the cultural and knowledge sharing net-
works offered by its diaspora. 
The importance of city-level and prov-
ince-level networks in attracting diaspora 
investment in China speaks to perhaps 
the greatest weakness of India’s diaspora 
engagement: while a national FDI strategy 
is now taking shape under Prime Minister 
Modi, there are very few initiatives at the 
local level to attract FDI. By comparison, 
much of China’s success as a recipient of 
diaspora investment has been due to city-
level and province-level FDI incentives. 
Given India’s pluralism and the federalist 
approach to state authority, Indian states 
can learn from China’s local initiatives in 
attracting diaspora-led investment. 
Appendix I: Remittances as an 
explanatory factor
Through the 1990s, India received a much 
higher share of global remittance flows than 
China. For instance, in 1990, India’s formal 
remittance inflow was over 12 times that 
received by China. By 2000, the gap had 
closed somewhat so that India received 2.5 
times the volume of remittances of China 
— still a major disparity given the relative 
size of emigrant populations from India 
and China in 2000.25 Remittance flows for 
the two countries have continued to con-
verge since the early 2000s. While both 
countries have seen an explosion in the 
aggregate level of incoming remittances, 
China’s inflows have increased at a quicker 
rate than India’s. In fact, remittance flows in 
2015 were recorded as $59 billion for India 
and $54 billion for China and are estimated 
to be almost equivalent in 2016.26
The Chinese government has done rela-
tively little to improve the ease of sending 
remittances. Since the 1980s, the price 
of sending remittances to China from 
most countries has decreased only incre-
mentally. China remains one of the more 
created overlapping jurisdictions between 
national and local governments, which 
make investment in most states burden-
some. Additionally, India has not seen a 
national anti-corruption campaign similar 
to that of President Xi. Rather than address-
ing diaspora-specific investment potential, 
however, the Indian government imple-
mented reforms that reduced red tape for 
overseas investors across the board. For 
instance, the government created an Invest-
ment Information Centre as a “one-stop 
shop” for maneuvering India’s FDI market, 
but the Centre had no additional value for 
investors from India’s diaspora.
Although the government has recognized 
the untapped investment potential of the 
diaspora, this recognition has not trans-
lated to a cohesive engagement strategy, 
nor has it led to an improvement in dias-
pora investment across sectors. Instead, 
the Indian government has created incen-
tives for FDI inflows to specific sectors as a 
means of leveraging the success of India’s 
diaspora in those industries. The most 
obvious example is the Information Tech-
nology sector (IT). In the 1970s and 1980s, 
overseas Indians in the U.S. attempted to 
invest in a nascent IT industry in India, but 
their pursuits were “quickly abandoned 
because of bureaucratic obstacles by the 
Indian government.”19 Over time, interac-
tion with overseas Indians in Silicon Valley 
helped to convince the government that 
diaspora-led FDI in India’s IT industry would 
improve the country’s development. India’s 
IT industry became one of the first in the 
country to open to partial, then full, foreign 
ownership thresholds. This sector-specific 
liberalization was a direct result of diaspora 
advocacy, as many U.S.-based Indians saw 
the opportunity for a mutual gain in offshor-
ing production and support services to India.
Recent progress in India’s market liberal-
ization suggests that India’s government, 
under Prime Minister Modi, seeks to 
reduce FDI barriers in the coming years. 
For instance, New Delhi announced in June 
2016 that it was relaxing FDI restrictions 
in multiple sectors. While the easing of 
regulations will also benefit diaspora inves-
tors, there remains a conspicuous lack of 
incentives for the diaspora community in 
government initiatives to attract FDI. Con-
sidering FDI in India rose from $36 billion 
in 2014 to $55.5 billion in 2016, reducing 
government regulation may be sufficient 
to increase investment without direct 
diaspora engagement.20
In spite of its limited role in attracting 
diaspora-led FDI, India’s government has 
a diverse set of diaspora engagement strat-
egies that are not focused on investment. 
For example, the transfer of technology 
and industry-specific knowledge has been 
much more broadly promoted than has 
diaspora-led FDI. Rather than identifying 
the success of India’s diaspora community 
in the U.S. and elsewhere as a source of 
investment, the Indian government has 
instead focused on the technical exper-
tise that can be shared through overseas 
networks. For example, India has offered 
cost-sharing programs with overseas Indian 
executives to “create programs within their 
companies in which Indian programmers 
could work in the United States with U.S. 
technology (at Indian wages plus travel-re-
lated cost).”21 Unfortunately, this diaspora 
engagement too has taken a narrow view 
so that only specific industries like IT have 
benefited from government-led initiatives.
Explaining the gap in  
diaspora investment
According to a 2006 World Bank Institute 
study, “the earnings of the 20 million-strong 
Indian diaspora are equivalent to about 
two-thirds of the gross domestic product 
of India.”22 Given the relative wealth of the 
diaspora, why then has there been low dias-
pora investment in India, especially when 
compared to China? 
Devesh Kapur, a leading expert on India’s 
economic development, contended that Chi-
nese emigrants are more “entrepreneurial” 
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